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Malaria has always been an important public health problem in Brazil. The early history of Brazilian malaria and 
its control was powered by colonisation by Europeans and the forced relocation of Africans as slaves. Internal migra-
tion brought malaria to many regions in Brazil where, given suitable Anopheles mosquito vectors, it thrived. Almost 
from the start, officials recognised the problem malaria presented to economic development, but early control efforts 
were hampered by still developing public health control and ignorance of the underlying biology and ecology of ma-
laria. Multiple regional and national malaria control efforts have been attempted with varying success. At present, the 
Amazon Basin accounts for 99% of Brazil’s reported malaria cases with regional increases in incidence often associ-
ated with large scale public works or migration. Here, we provide an exhaustive summary of primary literature in Eng-
lish, Spanish and Portuguese regarding Brazilian malaria control. Our goal was not to interpret the history of Brazilian 
malaria control from a particular political or theoretical perspective, but rather to provide a straightforward, chrono-
logical narrative of the events that have transpired in Brazil over the past 200 years and identify common themes.
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The early history of Brazilian malaria and its control 
was powered by European colonisation and the forced 
relocation of Africans as slaves. These immigrants 
brought malaria to many regions in Brazil where, given 
suitable anopheline mosquito vectors, it could thrive. 
Almost from the start, officials recognised the problem 
malaria presented to economic development, but control 
efforts were hampered by limited public health control 
and ignorance of the underlying biology and ecology of 
malaria. As World War II ended, Brazil was poised to 
confront this national scourge. It did so through multiple 
regional and national efforts, each with varying success.
Here, we describe the grand sweep of Brazilian ma-
laria and its control from the 1500s to the present. Our 
goal was not to interpret the history of Brazilian malaria 
control from a particular political or theoretical perspec-
tive, but rather to provide a straightforward, chronological 
narrative of the events that have transpired in Brazil over 
the past few hundred years and identify common themes. 
We view this review as a stepping off point for scholars 
interested in specific aspects of Brazilian malaria.
The early history of Brazilian malaria and regional 
control - Railroads and rubber
Brazilian malaria was first reported as “tertian and 
quartan fevers” affecting the Tupinambá Indians in 1587 
(Deane 1986, Coura et al. 2006). Molecular analysis 
suggests that Plasmodium falciparum malaria was intro-
duced to Brazil with the African slave trade, potentially 
as early as 1560 (Yalcindag et al. 2012). There is more 
debate regarding the origin of Plasmodium vivax malaria 
in Brazil, but molecular data suggests it was either intro-
duced once to South America 15,000-30,000 years ago 
or multiple times from a now extinct European P. vivax 
population less than 500 years ago (Taylor et al. 2013). 
Large scale epidemics were not reported during the co-
lonial period (Deane 1986, Coura et al. 2006). However, 
the Baixada Fluminense, a lowland convergence of four 
river basins in the state of Rio de Janeiro (RJ), was filled 
with malarious swamps (Gadelha 1998).
After the colonial period, the largest drivers of ma-
laria control intervention were the rubber industry and 
railroad construction (Deane 1986). Natural rubber was 
crucial to Brazil’s economy beginning in the middle of 
the XIX century (Stepan 2003). By the 1870s, migrants 
were fleeing northeastern droughts to seek work in the 
Amazon rubber industry. As immunologically naïve 
hosts, they were susceptible to malaria (Deane 1986, 
Coura et al. 2006). Simultaneously, efforts were made 
to interconnect the vast untapped lands of the Brazilian 
interior by trains and telegraph wires.
The abolition of slavery in 1888 disrupted the ag-
ricultural industry and the resultant disruption of irri-
gation and drainage systems at abandoned plantations 
led to the Baixada Fluminense, coastal plains of RJ and 
parts of the state of São Paulo (SP) being highly malar-
ious for decades (Deane 1986). Anti-malaria commis-
sions were started in 1891, but performed poorly due to 
limited funds, sporadic activity, ignorance and scattered 
administration (Gadelha 1998). In particular, Manaus, 
in the state of Amazonas (AM), went through four san-
itary commissions for the control of tropical diseases 
between 1897-1913 (Schweickardt & Lima 2010). From 
1890-1900, approximately 500,000 Brazilians migrated 
to the Amazon in a “chaotic flood,” with many becom-
ing rubber tappers (Stepan 2003). From 1892-1906, 26.6 
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people per 10,000 died of malaria in Northeast Brazil, 
with approximately half originating from outside the 
region (Packard & Gadelha 1997). Malaria was present 
throughout Brazil by 1900. Each year, there were six 
million cases, which represented 50% of Brazil’s popu-
lation (Coura et al. 2006).
The leading malaria institutes in Brazil were the 
Bacteriological Institute of São Paulo and the Domingos 
Freire Bacteriological Institute, founded in 1892 and 1893, 
respectively. Adolpho Lutz ran the Bacteriological Insti-
tute of São Paulo within a year of its founding. He created 
the first map of malaria in SP (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
Oswaldo Gonçalvez Cruz became the technical di-
rector of the Federal Serum Therapy Institute in Man-
guinhos, RJ in 1900 [later renamed the Oswaldo Cruz 
Institute (IOC)] (Deane 1988). His early published 
worked focused on malaria that occurred around RJ and 
a location in Baixada Fluminense near a railroad. Rail-
roads were the driving force for most of the malaria in-
terventions conducted by the Institute. In 1902, Oswaldo 
Cruz became the head director and Carlos Chagas joined 
the Institute (Benchimol & Silva 2008). Carlos Chagas 
would go on to publish papers on malaria prophylaxis 
which culminated in the proposal that malaria was an 
infection of the home (Deane 1988, 1992). Arthur Neiva 
would later join the Institute in 1906, as did Adolpho 
Lutz (Stepan 2003, Benchimol & Silva 2008).
In 1903, Adolpho Lutz identified Anopheles cruzi, a 
mosquito that bred in bromeliads, as the vector spread-
ing malaria along the Santos-São Paulo railroad (Lutz 
1903, Dourado 1992, Benchimol & Silva 2008). He was 
led to this hypothesis by the observation that much of the 
railroad was built at 900 m, where stagnant water was 
uncommon. Adolpho Lutz was also the first to hypothe-
sise that this was the cause of endemic malaria found in 
southern state of Santa Catarina (SC), where it had been 
reported since 1820. Unfortunately, foreign opposition 
to his hypothesis would limit control of this vector until 
the 1940s (Gadelha 1994).
While knowledge of the basic biology of malaria had 
recently grown, the strategies to confront it were still 
inchoate. From 1905-1906, Carlos Chagas was assigned 
to Itatinga, where malaria had halted the construction 
of a railroad. He initially surveyed anopheline species, 
their larvae habitats and their distance to domiciles. He 
identified elderly and young individuals that could act 
as parasite reservoirs. The local population lived in two 
large housing units without malaria protection and ini-
tial analysis suggested 30% were infected with malaria, 
typically P. vivax (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
Carlos Chagas applied “offensive” prevention meth-
ods and “defensive” methods inspired by Ronald Ross. 
Offensively, he killed adult mosquitoes within homes 
and nearby larvae. Defensively, he gave 50 cg quinine to 
workers every three days at the afternoon meal, which 
they accepted readily. He also destroyed larvae breed-
ing sites near the two housing units, treated children and 
the chronically ill and isolated patients with active blood 
infection. Individual protection of workers was deemed 
impossible (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
Workers wore thin clothing that mosquitoes could 
bite through and it was too hot to wear thicker fabric, 
therefore gloves and face netting were useless. While 
such protection might work for “white collar” workers, it 
would not for manual labourers. Instead, labourers were 
confined to screened housing that only had one entrance 
through two screen doors in an airlock configuration. 
Yet even this method had to go through a trial by error 
stage, as the initial mesh used to screen housing was too 
large to keep out smaller vectors. Asking healthy work-
ers to confine themselves to the sheds between dusk and 
after dawn was not considered acceptable, though by 
1907 he proposed that workers could be confined for 1 
or 2 h at dusk. Cases died off and there were none when 
he left in March, 1906 (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
In 1907, Carlos Chagas and Arthur Neiva travelled 
to the Baixada Fluminense, 60 km from the city of Rio 
de Janeiro, though Carlos Chagas would leave after only 
three months. There, workers were building waterworks 
and a central railroad (Agudelo 1990, Benchimol & 
Silva 2008). They were charged with providing malaria 
prophylaxis for the 3,500 workers damming the Xerém 
River (Stepan 2003). Work on the railroad in Xerém and 
Mantiqueira had halted due to epidemics that left 96% of 
workers infected with malaria (Agudelo 1990). A hospi-
tal was built at the end of the railroad and larval habitat 
was filled or rechanneled, including the destruction of 
bromeliads. Insecticides were applied to water deposits 
near domiciles. Larvae-eating fish were used and wells 
were coated with petroleum. All infected patients in the 
area were treated, regardless of whether they were in-
volved in the public work projects and those with gam-
etes were isolated (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
All workers were to take quinine every week or be 
dismissed, though Arthur Neiva noted that the dosage re-
quired to treat malaria increased over 20 months from 50 
cg every three days to the same dose daily. The mandato-
ry use of quinine was extremely unpopular with labour-
ers. A worker who was fired for not taking his medication 
attacked the staff member responsible for administering 
quinine the next day and was killed. Another quinine ad-
ministrator was harassed by an engineer and 100 labour-
ers. After Arthur Neiva stated they should all be fired, 
this group visited the hospital (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
After three months, Chagas was called away to lead 
malaria interventions in the state of Minas Gerais (MG), 
near the Bicudo River. Almost all of the 1,500 workers in 
the area had been infected with malaria. The region was 
crisscrossed with bogs, bromeliads, rivers, streams and 
swamps where larvae could breed year round, leaving wa-
ter sanitation futile. The constant movement of workers 
down the railroad line meant that personal and collective 
preventive measures were also ineffective. After symptoms 
disappeared, workers assumed they were cured, but instead 
they became chronically ill (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
In response, the medical commission established 
three measures that all personnel were to follow. One, all 
sick went to infirmaries and only left when authorised. 
Two, those considered epidemiologically dangerous, 
were isolated in covered wagons or sheds from dusk and 
703Mem Inst Oswaldo Cruz, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 110(6), September 2015
only left at dawn. Three, all personnel took 50 cg of qui-
nine every three days (though this seems to have changed 
to every other day and later every day). Those that did not 
comply were fined or dismissed. Carlos Chagas divided 
the population into the uninfected and infected. Howev-
er, there were so many chronic cases that only the most 
serious were isolated. Early reports suggest that labour-
ers argued that quinine was no longer needed when they 
appeared in good health and that the medication had side 
effects. Over time, this methodology reduced the number 
of relapses (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
In 1908, Arthur Neiva was hired to conduct an anti-
malaria campaign along a railroad that was attempting 
to link Bauru, SP, to Cuiabá, in the state of Mato Grosso 
(MT). Again, Arthur Neiva applied quinine as his chief 
intervention, though his experiences in the Baixada Flu-
minense convinced him to not make it mandatory. In-
stead, he unsuccessfully used advertising. His campaign 
focused more on alleviating symptoms than prevention 
with Neiva’s only commitment being that deaths from 
malaria should not increase. The railway made it to the 
banks of the Paraná River by 1910, but health was so 
poor that a bridge over the river was not constructed 
until 1926. Construction claimed 1,600 lives by 1909 
(Benchimol & Silva 2008).
Between 1907-1915, physicians associated with the 
Rondon Commission combated malaria in the Sertão. 
The commission was a Brazilian military operation in 
northeastern Brazil that was to extend telegraph lines 
from Cuiabá to Santo António de Madeira and then 
Manaus (Caser & Sá 2011). The semiarid Sertão had 
river valleys that annually flooded, which allowed some 
crops to grow, but also provided breeding ground for 
vectors (Packard & Gadelha 1997, Packard 2007, Caser 
& Sá 2011). Malaria was endemic and the population 
was constantly being refreshed with new migrants with 
no resistance to malaria (Caser & Sá 2011).
While the commission was ultimately successful, 
disease, chiefly malaria, slowed progress and discour-
aged settlement by others - indeed, the story of disease 
and death that emerged from their work dissuaded future 
migrants in the years to come. Physicians suggested that 
geography and climate were conducive to reproduction 
of mosquitoes and the development of diseases includ-
ing malaria. They blamed the high number of cases on 
the rubber tappers that lived in poor housing, ate poorly, 
abused alcohol, overworked and spent long periods in 
swamps (Caser & Sá 2011).
During the initial years of the Rondon Commission, 
there were too few physicians to cover the number of 
staff that became ill. Physicians initially had two support 
staff each and worked in tents with capacity for 16 men. 
In 1910, they created a sanitary service for the Rondon 
Commission. This service would provide the necessary 
infrastructure to prevent and treat malaria and other dis-
eases. It was be under the control of two physicians that 
would rotate between the infirmaries of the northern and 
southern work sites (Santo António de Madeira and Ser-
ra do Norte) and the telegraph construction sites every 
three months. Eight staff members travelled with them. 
Prophylactic treatment for malaria was provided at the 
infirmaries. Malaria was prevented through strict con-
trol of staff diet, alcohol prohibition and the use of bed 
nets. At meals, 30-50 cg of quinine salt were distribut-
ed at the physician’s discretion. Furthermore, land near 
the camp would be drained, pools of water filled and 
mosquito larvae destroyed. Those infected with malaria 
were to be isolated at the infirmary, which in turn would 
be brick structures, built on high ground and as far from 
mosquitoes as possible (Caser & Sá 2011).
Returning to the work of the IOC, Oswaldo Cruz was 
hired to conduct an antimalaria campaign for those con-
structing the Madeira-Mamoré Railroad in the state of 
Rondônia (RO) in 1910. Attempts to build a railroad in 
the area had started in 1878. The railway was to connect 
Bolivian rubber production to Porto Velho, RO. It was 
nicknamed the “Devil Railway” because thousands of 
workers died of malaria building it between 1907-1912 
(Lourenço-de-Oliveira et al. 1989, Deane 1992, Ste-
pan 2003, Benchimol & Silva 2008). The railroad had 
previously hired American physicians, including five 
that had served during the Panama Canal construction. 
Therefore, hiring Oswaldo Cruz was at least partially a 
political ploy to silence criticism, as he was already re-
spected nationally and international as the director of the 
Institute and due to his successful campaign against yel-
low fever in the federal capital. His suggestions echoed 
the system that the Americans had already put into place 
(Schweickardt & Lima 2007).
Based at the Candelária Hospital, Cruz examined 
the conditions of the 113 km of completed railroad and 
nearby villages along the Madeira River for 28 days dur-
ing the summer. Oswaldo Cruz praised the railroad for 
housing staff in Porto Velho because of the city had a 
functioning water and sewage systems and was built on 
high ground. Yet health conditions were poor elsewhere. 
This was partially due to the influx of immunologically 
naïve Brazilians, but also due to rubber tappers poor diet 
and the lack of sewage systems and garbage collection 
in Santo António de Madeira, the base of railroad con-
struction operations. There was little health care outside 
the camps and the available quinine was expensive and 
adulterated. Ninety percent of the workers had been in-
fected with malaria and 75% of those had been infected 
with P. falciparum (Deane 1988, Agudelo 1990, Stepan 
2003, Benchimol & Silva 2008, Caser & Sá 2011).
Oswaldo Cruz continued to rely upon quinine as a 
prophylactic, but resistance was reported. He noted that 
patients could “die of malaria or from quinine intoxi-
cation” (Deane 1988, Agudelo 1990, Stepan 2003). His 
other methods of control were installing house screens 
and bed nets (Deane 1992). Oswaldo Cruz discarded de-
stroying larval habitat as a control method. He stated that 
workers continued to fall ill because they did not comply 
with the measures applied by the sanitation corps. This 
statement was made despite suggesting that labourers 
should take daily doses of 2-3 g of quinine a day, which 
was past the point of toxicity (Benchimol & Silva 2008).
Oswaldo Cruz recommended that railroad labour-
ers not be paid if they failed to take their daily dosage 
or failed to use their mosquito nets. Those that resisted 
prophylactic treatment should be fired and those with 
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chronic infection either fired or never hired at all. While 
the railroad was completed, it is unclear how closely his 
methods were followed after he left. A report from 1926 
suggests they reduced malaria cases from 40-10% and 
deaths from 15-2%. More recent scholarship suggests 
the railroad continued to replace workers because of 
deaths (Benchimol & Silva 2008). After he left, 90% of 
workers still contracted malaria (Stepan 2003).
In 1912, Oswaldo Cruz returned to the Amazon to 
create a plan for sanitising the entire Amazon Basin at 
the behest of the Committee for the Defense of Rubber 
created by the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and 
Commerce. His team, led by Carlos Chagas, travelled 
along Brazil’s rivers from the coastal city of Belém, in 
the state of Pará (PA), to the interior of Manaus and vis-
ited most major rubber extraction sites. Unfortunately, 
the team visited the Amazon during the season when 
most rubber tappers were unreachable in the forest. Yet 
they still came to a number of conclusions. First, quinine 
was too expensive, adulterated and rare. Second, Brazil-
ians disliked taking it. Third, new construction in major 
cities was generating additional vector habitats, which 
made malaria control difficult (Stepan 2003).
Oswaldo Cruz identified a number of challenges to 
conducting malaria interventions in the Amazon. One 
was that its inhabitants were diffusely spread over vast 
regions and thus communication between them was 
costly and slow. Another was that rubber tappers worked 
along the banks of rivers, at times at great distance from 
one another, as well as far from population centres. 
Travelling down some rivers was impossible at low tide 
unless by canoe. Furthermore, rubber tappers barracks 
were usually located far from the river deep within the 
forest interior, so they only saw them every 15 days or 
every month. He proposed that free or low cost quinine 
should be distributed on a large scale at towns and rub-
ber tapping sites throughout the interior. Chronic infec-
tion was common and thus regular treatment provided 
by small stations was called for rather than hospitalisa-
tion (Schweickardt & Lima 2010). The rise of rubber tree 
extraction in Southeast Asia put an end to the boom in 
this industry during the early XX century.
The report of Arthur Neiva and Belisário Penna’s trip 
to the Sertão in 1912 influenced how Brazil’s ruling class 
viewed people that lived in the Sertão and thus the search 
for national identity. Their report used images to paint a 
picture of forsaken people that were resistant to change 
and marked by backwardness, disease, isolation, illiter-
acy and poverty. They argued that these issues were not 
the result of racial inbreeding, an unfortunate debate of 
the XIX century, but rather due to their suffering from 
malaria and other avoidable diseases. Sertão’s population 
was spread thinly over a large area, had no communi-
cation with the coast and was lawless. There were few 
healthcare providers and therefore citizens relied upon 
folk remedies. Their report was picked up by the journals 
and newspapers in RJ and magnified by recent claims by 
Carlos Chagas that disease was the greatest roadblock to 
Brazil’s progress as a nation. In words of another contem-
porary figure, Brazil was an “enormous hospital.” It in-
spired the creation of the Pro-Sanitation League of Bra-
zil, a movement to sanitise the region, advocacy for rural 
preventative health posts, sanitary education and cam-
paign to federalise Brazilian public health (de Sá 2009).
Brazil’s first national malaria control efforts 
In 1920, the government created the National De-
partment of Public Health (DNSP). Its division of public 
health focused on Chagas disease, hookworm and ma-
laria (Gadelha 1998). The first health unit of the Rural 
Prophylactic Service in Baixada Fluminense was run 
by the mayor of Nova Iguaçu, who later became the Di-
rector of the National Department of Health. There was 
a severe malaria epidemic in the Baixada Fluminense 
that eventually spread throughout RJ, but the public 
health response was more successful than previous ef-
forts (Gadelha 1998). Vector and malaria control meth-
ods included filling ditches, improved drainage, treating 
pooled water on riverbanks, improving water ways, oil-
ing water and quinine use (Deane 1992).
For many of the early years of national malaria control 
efforts, The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was a crucial 
partner. From 1922-1925, Mark Boyd and the RF stud-
ied malaria epidemiology in the plains surrounding Gua-
nabara Bay, RJ, in the Baixada Fluminense. Their goal 
was to test if American malaria control methods could 
be used in the tropics and create guidelines for tropical 
malaria control to “ascertain a simple, economical and 
effective method of malaria control adapted for a tropical 
area, which will offer prospects of permanent relief with 
a minimum of maintenance”. After a six month survey, 
Francis Root was the first to describe Anopheles darlingi, 
the likely the malaria vector in the Baixada Fluminense 
(Deane 1986, 1988, Gadelha 1998). In 1925, the RF and 
state government reached an agreement to focus work on 
seven districts where drainage was the most promising 
malaria control measure (Vincent 1927). Their plan was 
to spend a year in observation, followed by a two-year 
campaign of control and maintenance. This consisted of 
drainage projects combined with the application of Paris 
green and biological control (Deane 1988, Gadelha 1998).
Another RF staff member, Nelson Davis, studied an 
outbreak of mountainous malaria in Angra dos Reis, RJ, 
in 1925. He acknowledged that autochthonous malaria 
might be propagated by a local bromeliad mosquito, but 
rejected the hypothesis based on his data (Davis 1926). 
Elsewhere that year, Arthur Neiva reported to the “Light 
and Power Company” that the bromeliad vector exist-
ed in the Serra de Cubatão and that he had successfully 
controlled An. (Kerteszia) cruzi in Iguape, SP, through 
deforestation. This contrast in approach underscores the 
continued disagreement between Brazilian professionals 
and those from abroad regarding the viability of brome-
liad malaria (Gadelha 1994).
In 1926 and 1927, control efforts at the sites covered by 
Mark Boyd deteriorated because of the foundation sought 
funding from the municipal government while finances 
were consolidating at higher levels. In 1927, the RF signed 
a contract with RJ where 50% of survey costs and 100% 
of maintenance costs would be covered by the state gov-
ernment (Gadelha 1998). In Itaperuna, no malaria was 
reported in 1927, two years after work started. In Capi-
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vary (sic), drainage was almost complete by 1927 and, 
compared to a year earlier, half the malaria was reported 
(Vincent 1927). At the project’s end, no malaria epidemics 
occurred in the study areas (Deane 1988, Gadelha 1998).
By 1928, the malaria service had been absorbed into 
the State Department of Health, but the RF continued 
its collaboration with the state. Efforts shifted to mak-
ing drainage permanent. In Capivary, Macahé (sic) and 
Itaperuna, expensive surface ditch maintenance was re-
placed with subsoil drainage. The seven districts reported 
a reduction in Anopheles breeding and malaria incidence; 
no malaria was reported in Itaperuna and reduced cases 
were reported in Queimados, Capivary and Conceição de 
Macabu. In Carapebús (sic), preliminary survey and field 
work were conducted in two areas (Vincent 1928). Work 
continued until 1929. However, the maintenance phase 
of control broke down due to municipal level disinterest 
(Agudelo 1990). Despite this, their work would influence 
future Brazilian malaria control and contributed to local 
malaria control (Deane 1988, Gadelha 1998)
According to Barros Barreto, who ran the DNSP, “the 
attempts from 1891 to 1933 to re-establish the former 
prosperity of Baixada were fruitless” (Gadelha 1998). 
Furthermore, An. darlingi was not just a problem in the 
Baixada Fluminense. It was established in 1931 that An. 
darlingi was infected with sporozoites in Belém (Mason 
1931, Davis & Kumm 1932, Vincent 1933). Infected An. 
darlingi were also reported in França and Itapira, state of 
Bahia (BA) (Mason 1931).
Greater northeastern Brazil had malaria epidemics 
during the 1930s. Most land was owned by a few estate 
owners, often dating back to the XVII century. It was 
populated with subsistence farmers and sharecroppers, 
as well as outsiders from nearby towns and seasonal mi-
grant workers from Brazil’s interior. Subsistence farmers 
from Agreste, which included the states of Paraíba (PB), 
Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and BA, often migrat-
ed to the coast for seasonal work. Agreste was nestled 
between the Sertão and the humid coastal plain of the 
Zona da Mata (Packard & Gadelha 1997, Packard 2007). 
During droughts, the people of Sertão migrated to the 
Zona de Mata, Agreste or the Amazon rubber industry. 
Epidemics in northeastern Brazil were often caused by 
people from Sertão returning from the interior or coast. 
For example, a three year drought in Sertão scattered 
residents until 1935. Returning migrants introduced ma-
laria, which led to an outbreak that began in 1934 and 
ending in 1937 (Packard & Gadelha 1997, Packard 2007).
Anopheles gambiae galvanising impact on Brazilian 
malaria control 
The second malaria era started with the introduction 
of the African malaria vector, An. gambiae to Brazil. 
The campaign it sparked proved to Brazil that an ef-
fective national public health response to malaria was 
possible. Adolpho Lutz visited the port city of Natal, in 
the state of Rio Grande do Norte (RN) to locate an area 
free of mosquitoes for a leprosy facility in July, 1928. 
He made no mention of finding An. gambiae and only 
28 malaria cases were reported in that year. However, he 
warned that African mosquitoes could be introduced to 
the area from Dakar, Senegal. This would be facilitated 
by mail runs made by seaplanes or fast French destroy-
ers called Avisos that landed near Natal on the Potengí 
River, starting in March, 1928 (Pinto 1939, Deane 1986, 
Agudelo 1990, Coura et al. 2006).
Within two years, An. gambiae was introduced to 
Natal from Dakar, most likely by adult mosquitoes that 
travelled in these planes or ships, as no larvae were found 
(Mason 1931, Pinto 1939, Packard 2007). By March 
1930, Raymond Shannon, a RF entomologist working on 
the yellow fever, reported there were 2,000 An. gambiae 
larvae 1 km from where the mail vehicles landed (Deane 
1992, Killeen et al. 2002). There was a large outbreak 
of malaria in Natal between April-June (Pinto 1939). By 
May, all residents were sick with malaria (Deane 1986). 
The RF predicted that An. gambiae would probably re-
main highly localised, but possibly spread coastally by 
plane or ship or internally by car and train. It would be 
particularly a concern in deforested areas (Mason 1931).
In contrast to this conservative analysis, Frederick 
Soper sent a telegram to the Department of Health that 
read “Poor Brazil” (Coura et al. 2006). Soper was the 
director of the International Health Division in South 
America at the RF (Barber 1940). He had worked on 
yellow fever elimination since 1927. In 1931, there were 
344 deaths in Natal in a neighbourhood near the Avisos 
docks. In response, the RF yellow fever service helped 
the Brazilian government eradicate An. gambiae in Na-
tal using Paris green. Work ceased in 1932 as Frederick 
Soper was unable to interest the foundation, state gov-
ernment or federal health authorities in a larger scale 
An. gambiae elimination program [US National Library 
of Medicine (profiles.nlm.nih.gov/VV/Views/Exhibit/
narrative/campaign.html) Agudelo 1990, Packard & 
Gadelha 1997]. Unfortunately by 1931, prevailing winds 
spread the vector up the coastline 115 miles, though two 
dry years kept it from spreading farther (Fosdick 1938).
By 1938, An. gambiae had quietly spread from the north-
west to the less arid valleys of Assu, Apodí and Jaguaribe 
Rivers (Deane 1988, Packard & Gadelha 1997, Killeen et 
al. 2002). This covered localities that were 200 miles to the 
northwest of Natal (Fosdick 1938). When another drought 
occurred in Sertão in 1936, it forced migrants into Zona da 
Mata and Agreste. This led to a predictable increase in ma-
laria cases in 1938 and 1939, but this time the epidemic was 
magnified by An. gambiae. Many of the victims of malaria 
were from Sertão due to their minimal acquired immunity 
(Packard & Gadelha 1997, Packard 2007).
During the summer of 1938, a “pandemic” was declared 
in the state of Ceará (CE) and RN where An. gambiae was 
present. The epidemic had started on the coast and spread 
up the river valleys into the interior, leading to 150,000 cas-
es and 14,000 deaths in eight months (Deane 1988, 1992, 
Packard 2007). In some Brazilian states, the invasion of 
An. gambiae was followed in a few weeks by epidemic ma-
laria (Barber 1940). For example, An. gambiae was found 
in October in CE and epidemic malaria was reported in 
April [US National Library of Medicine (profiles.nlm.nih.
gov/VV/Views/Exhibit/narrative/campaign.html)]. Around 
40,000 people were infected with more than 20,000 deaths 
(Agudelo 1990, Killeen et al. 2002). In the Jaguaribe Valley 
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of CE, 10% of the population died. Crops were not plant-
ed and salt production was reduced in some areas. It was 
projected that everyone in the affected areas would be un-
der government relief by 1939 (Fosdick 1938). There were 
600,000 cases by the end of the epidemic (Deane 1986).
Towards the end of 1938, officials from the govern-
ment and the RF met in the epidemic area and decided 
that an autonomous, well-funded and highly trained or-
ganisation needed to be created to eradicate An. gambiae 
(Gusmão 1982). They also concluded that, once An. gam-
biae reached a river valley, it would spread throughout 
unless blocked by a natural or artificial barrier (Fosdick 
1938). Along the coast, An. gambiae spread at an average 
speed of 40 miles a year, most likely by boat. Yet without 
rivers to follow, the arid interior blocked its progress. In 
retrospect, Soper claimed that 15 or 20 men could have 
blocked its entrance into the narrow alluvial passages 
that gave it access to the interior (Fosdick 1939).
According to the journal Gazeta de Notícias, CE, 
“human language is…[in]adequate to describe the des-
olation…in which suffering, tears and mourning spread 
their lugubrious mantle over thousands of graves. The 
general belief was that the Northeast would be depopu-
lated because those that did not die at once would aban-
don it” (Killeen et al. 2002). These events put malaria on 
the national stage and raised the spectre that An. gambi-
ae might reach the Panama Canal (Deane 1992, Packard 
& Gadelha 1997, Packard 2007).
In August 1938, President Getúlio Vargas created a 
new emergency antimalaria service (Killeen et al. 2002). 
In January 1939, the president decreed the creation of the 
Northeast Malaria Service (Agudelo 1990). By then, An. 
gambiae had spread 300 miles to the west of Natal and 
was found in 12,000 mi2. Federal governmental funding 
went from $250,000 in 1938 to $500,000 in 1939 with 
the RF providing $100,000 in 1939 and $230,000 in 1940 
(Fosdick 1939).
While the Northeast Malaria Service focused on ma-
laria, Frederick Soper pushed the RF to focus on confin-
ing An. gambiae to arid regions, or even eradicating it, 
because he believed it was a threat to North and South 
America (Fosdick 1938, Packard & Gadelha 1997). The 
RF assisted in the financing and organisation of the ser-
vice using the infrastructure created for the yellow fe-
ver service ($3,200,000 dollars in 1995 dollars) (Killeen 
et al. 2002). It was willing to pay 20% of the service’s 
costs, if it had direct control (Fosdick 1939). Frederick 
Soper ran this service from 1939-1941 along with Pau-
lo Antunes, 70 physicians and 4,000 guards (Agudelo 
1990, Deane 1992, Killeen et al. 2002).
Initial efforts were “disappointing” because the ser-
vice started at the beginning of the rainy season when 
An. gambiae spread most rapidly. The rain led to wide-
spread malaria epidemics and the treatment of 114,000 
people. Nonetheless, there was a measurable reduction 
in mortality. By July, the service had a staff of 2,000 
physicians, technicians, scouts, inspectors, guards and 
labourers. Despite a prolonged rainy season, the spread 
of the vector had been minimised and vectors disap-
peared from some previously heavily infested areas. The 
extended dry season was a boon to the An. gambiae con-
trol program (Fosdick 1939).
Frederick Soper framed his efforts as a war, with fu-
migation posts on outgoing roads, likened to the Magi-
not Line. His “scorched earth” was a 10-mile perimeter 
around An. gambiae range limits, which was to be kept 
noninfectible. The entire area was mapped from the air 
to ensure no collections of water were left untreated with 
larvicides within the perimeter or the infected zone (Fos-
dick 1939). Staff also used atebrine and sometimes qui-
nine (Silveira & de Rezende 2001). Homes were sprayed 
with insecticides and every car and train that left the 
area was fumigated, as well as every boat and plane dis-
infected before leaving for uninfested ports. This did not 
always work; at least one unfumigated car took a back-
road and spread An. gambiae miles into uninfested terri-
tory. Another time, a fishing boat spread it up the coast. 
Still, by December, An. gambiae was pushed back to the 
main river valleys and the coast. There was optimism 
that it might be eradicated (Fosdick 1939).
Cases began to diminish and they treated 30,000 in 
January 1940 and just 400 in September (Gusmão 1982). 
After the rainy season, An. gambiae was restricted to the 
lower Jaguaribe Valley, though another small population 
was found in October, 60 km from the infested area (Fos-
dick 1940). The last An. gambiae larvae was reported in 
November 14 1940 (Agudelo 1990, Killeen et al. 2002).
Control efforts were aided by An. gambiae indoor-bit-
ing behaviour and the Northeast dry season, during which 
it was difficult for mosquitoes to locate breeding grounds 
(Barber 1940, Killeen et al. 2002). They were also aid-
ed by Frederick Soper’s use of staff that had previously 
worked on the Anopheles aegypti campaign and an almost 
militaristic approach to program administration (Deane 
1988). Finally, recent molecular work suggests that the 
invading vector was actually Anopheles arabiensis. This 
species is adapted to arid climates and therefore it may not 
have been able to invade the wetter regions surrounding 
northeastern Brazil (Parmakelis et al. 2008).
In a memo to the RF in 1942, Fredrick Soper said: 
“The eradication of An. gambiae from…Northeast Bra-
zil is an important event in public health….because it re-
lieves the continent of the immediate threat…[and] dra-
matically calls attention to the possibility of controlling 
mosquito-borne disease through species eradication.”. 
Frederick Soper later said that the success in eradicating 
An. gambiae rehabilitated the concept of malaria erad-
ication. His success, Arnoldo Gabaldon’s in Venezuela 
(Griffing et al. 2014) and others led to a shift from the 
holistic approach put forth by the League of Nations Ma-
laria Commission to Malaria Eradication through vector 
control (Packard 2007).
Fredrerick Soper’s influence ended when he was 
called away to World War II (Deane 1986, Agudelo 
1990). However, the end of his campaign did not mark 
the end of An. gambiae attempts to invade South Amer-
ica. By 1941, commercial aircraft leaving Africa were 
sprayed before leaving and again upon arrival in Brazil. 
Dead An. gambiae were reported on planes in October 
1941 and January 1942 (Fosdick 1941). In 1943, live An. 
gambiae were reported on planes arriving from Africa 
and mosquitoes were found in homes near Natal airport. 
The Brazilian government invited a RF staff member to 
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review protective measures and resurvey the formerly 
infested area. The report recommended that emergency 
landing fields in Brazil needed to focus more on “disin-
secting” transatlantic planes on arrival (Fosdick 1943). 
After these efforts, the RF generally fell silent on malar-
ia. They did, however, fund an entomological laboratory 
at the Malaria Institute in RJ in 1951, where insecticides, 
herbicides and molluscicides were tested. They also in-
vestigated how to spray bromeliads (Barnard 1951).
The shift to national Brazilian malaria control 
During the 1940s, there were four-six million malaria 
cases a year among 45 million Brazilians. More than 50% 
of cases occurred outside of the Amazon (Deane 1986, 
1988, Coura et al. 2006, Packard 2007). Some cases were 
due to the government enlisting 50,000 northeasterners as 
“rubber soldiers” (Deane 1986, Lourenço-de-Oliveira et 
al. 1989, Coura et al. 2006). Outside the Amazon, valleys 
with large rivers supported malaria including São Fran-
cisco, PR and the Baixada Fluminense (Deane 1986).
There were three organisations involved in Brazilian 
malaria control: the São Paulo State Antimalarial Ser-
vice, the Special Public Health Service in the Amazon 
(SESP) and the National Malaria Service (SNM) (Deane 
1988, Silveira & de Rezende 2001). SESP was founded 
in 1942 with financial support from the Brazilian gov-
ernment and the US Institute of Inter-American Affairs 
(IAIA), which was then coordinated by Nelson Rocke-
feller and advised by RF staff. SESP was partially the 
product of a meeting of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
of the American Republics that was held in RJ after the 
invasion of Pearl Harbor. The United States of Ameri-
ca needed raw materials for the war effort, particularly 
rubber from the Amazon, after the Japanese cut-off sup-
plies and iron from the Rio Doce Valley, after the Ger-
mans cut-off European supplies. The goals of SESP were 
(i) to provide sanitation for the Amazon Basin, mostly 
through malaria control and health care for rubber tap-
pers and (ii) to provide training for physicians, nurses 
and sanitary engineers. Eighty percent of SESP’s fund-
ing came from the IAIA until 1944, when Brazil began 
to nationalise it. While SESP was nominally under the 
Ministry of Education and Health, in practice it was au-
tonomous. Belém was the centre of field operations and 
training (de Campos 1998, 2008).
Though the Americans viewed SESP as a temporary 
wartime program, the Brazilian government viewed it 
as a convenient tool for the expansion of economic ac-
tivity and public authority that did not conflict with the 
existing public health agenda. Effectively, the IAIA 
subsidised the creation of a network of health facilities 
in the Amazon focused on malaria control and health 
care for rubber tappers, as well as the expansion of state 
power into the Amazon and the Rio Doce Valley. In the 
Northeast, a few cities received additional malaria con-
trol around American bases (particularly, Belém, Recife 
and Natal). They identified the 30 most important popu-
lations centres in the Amazon, established headquarters 
for health districts, then divided these health districts into 
subdistricts and then zones managed by sanitary inspec-
tors once a week. SESP gave 7.7 million tablets of atebrine 
to rubber tappers across the Amazon Basin by 1946. How-
ever, their methods were insufficient to control malaria in 
the Amazon. SESP also provided malaria control in that 
part of the Rio Doce Valley had iron, mica and quartz 
mining sites, as well as a railroad in disrepair - but only 
after the RF refused to run the program. This program 
was successful, partially because the area was so much 
smaller than the Amazon (de Campos 1998, 1999, 2008).
The SNM was created in 1941 and was run by Mario 
Pinotti starting in 1942 (Deane 1988). In 1943, the SNM 
began to study the life history, distribution and density 
of the An. (Kerteszia) complex in southern Brazil. “Bro-
meliad malaria” covered 40,000 km2 and thus one mil-
lion Brazilians across the coasts of the state of Paraná 
(PR), northern the state of Rio Grande do Sul, SP and 
SC. Furthermore the vector was present from PB to RN, 
but only the South had a sufficient density of bromeliads 
to support malaria endemically. They found high den-
sities of bromeliads in major cities like Florianópolis, 
small towns like Brusque and Joinville, as well as har-
bours, resorts and beaches near rainforests. This meant 
bromeliad malaria, or “forest malaria” was effectively 
an urban concern. It was also highly domestic; 99.2% of 
the 20,000 mosquitoes captured in homes in 1944 and 
1945 were Kerteszia species, which bit during all hours, 
inside or outside the home (Gadelha 1994).
In response, 20 million bromeliads were destroyed 
amongst the houses nestled in the low rocky areas of 
Florianópolis between 1944-1947. This eradicated ma-
laria from the city. However, it was dangerous and tedi-
ous work and mosquitoes still flew from faraway forests 
into cities. Therefore control efforts shifted to deforest-
ation and less commonly to herbicides, particularly cop-
per sulfate. A recommended deforestation method was 
to remove trees 500-1,000 m from towns and then plant 
two-thirds of that land with vegetables and flowering 
plants and one third eucalyptus. This trend continued 
through 1950 when autochthones cases were considered 
rare. Herbicides, chemotherapy and DDT would eventu-
ally replace deforestation as the preferred control meth-
od. However, the vector’s tendency to bite wherever and 
whenever it liked limited the benefits of DDT domicile 
spraying, which led to the resurgence of deforestation 
as the preferred control method by the 1970s (Gadelha 
1994). Later scholarship reached the consensus that An. 
cruzi, bellator and homunculus were the vectors respon-
sible for bromeliad malaria (Deane 1986). International-
ly, An. (Kerteszia) cruzi was finally acknowledged as a 
potential vector due to work by the US Army in Trinidad 
(Rozeboom & Laird 1942).
Brazilian malaria after the introduction of DDT and 
chloroquine (CQ) 
DDT was first used in Brazil in an organised fash-
ion in Breves, PA, by the SESP in 1945. Houses were 
sprayed every two months and later every four. CQ tab-
lets were given out to doctors, malaria inspectors and in-
fluential locals to distribute to malaria patients. Malaria 
incidence drastically decreased. Later, CQ was distrib-
uted at hospitals in Belém and Santarém with total doses 
of 1,500 mg (Reyes 1981, Deane 1988).
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Due to the success of this effort, DDT was system-
atically used in the state of Amapá (AP), AM (includ-
ing Manaus), RO (Porto Velho in 1946, other villages 
in 1947 and the railroad in 1948) and PA (including the 
Bolonha and Água Preta dams) to reduce An. darlingi 
populations (Deane et al. 1948, Lourenço-de-Oliveira et 
al. 1989). In Belém and Manaus, spraying included hous-
es, cinemas, churches, theatres and night schools (Deane 
et al. 1948). By 1950, the SNM had moved into the Am-
azon and managed control everywhere except in SP. Ma-
laria had been wiped out in the Northeast, decreased on 
the coastal plain and was reduced in the Amazon. By 
1954, DDT spraying covered regions occupied by three 
million Brazilians (Deane 1988).
In 1956, Mario Pinotti became the director of the Na-
tional Department for Rural Endemic Diseases, a newly 
created department in the Ministry of Health that central-
ised public health activities against many endemic diseas-
es including malaria, yellow fever and Chagas disease. He 
changed the SNM into the Malaria Eradication Campaign 
(CEM) in 1957 (Deane 1988) in response to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) establishment of the Glob-
al Malaria Eradication Program in 1955. CEM decided to 
put CQ in table salt in areas where insecticides were dif-
ficult to apply. This was called “Pinotti’s method”. After 
early 1950s trials, chloroquinised salt was widely distrib-
uted in Brazil (Payne 1988). Initially, a fine CQ powder 
was added to coarse salt in 30 kg bags. After adjusting 
the mixture to avoid CQ settling, chloroquinised salt was 
successfully used by the Industry and Trade of Ores S.A., 
mining company in AP (Gusmão 1982, Deane 1988).
As Mario Pinotti’s political career began to fade in 
1960, so too did the use of chloroquinised salt due to 
concern that targeted populations were unevenly pro-
tected (Hochman 2008). In AM, chloroquinised salt dis-
tribution was no longer required, but it was distributed 
until supplies ran out (Póvoa 1993). Still, chloroquinised 
salt continued to be used in French Guiana (1967-1971), 
Guyana (1961-1965) and Suriname (1966-1972). It has 
been argued that chloroquinised salt may have encour-
aged early parasite resistance (Payne 1988).
CEM reached the state of SP in 1959. Malaria was 
common throughout the state from the 1930s-1950s. Peo-
ple migrated from the countryside to urban centres and 
the state shifted from agriculture to industrialisation 
(Alves et al. 2004). During the 1930s-1950s, SP malaria 
control initially consisted of small, ineffectual engineer-
ing projects to control vectors, with funding often coming 
directly from land owners. It then shifted to focal moni-
toring. Breeding sites and larvae involved in transmission 
were identified and larvicides were applied. The impact 
of these efforts on An. darlingi populations were limited 
because they were time consuming and the number of po-
tential breeding sites overwhelming. Control efforts were 
limited to infrastructure, agribusiness and economically 
important urban environments (Barata 1998).
CEM began in 1959 and focused on the 198 munic-
ipalities that had malaria. The attack phase of control 
occurred between 1960-1963 and consisted of spraying 
houses with DDT every six months. Inhabitants with 
fever were actively sought out and 10% of the popula-
tion was tested for malaria each year. In addition, 5,000 
posts were created for passive surveillance and malaria 
treatment. By 1968, 68% of the population was living 
in a malaria-free zone, with much of the remainder in 
the consolidation phase (31%). It took four years to com-
pletely interrupt malaria transmission (Barata 1998).
In AP, a mining company established a communi-
ty named Serra do Navio around 1954. By 1960, CEM 
was providing AP with chloroquinised salt, but starting 
in 1963 the company began to provide miners and all 
other inhabitants with chloroquinised salt in Serra do 
Navio, Porto Platon and Vila Amazonas. They continued 
to do so for the next 30 years. Chloroquinised salt led 
to a sharp decrease in malaria infections with no cases 
reported in Serra do Navio by the early 1990s. In the 
1960s, An. darlingi was found in residential areas, but 
the company’s malaria control program, which included 
biannual DDT spraying, locally eradicated An. darlingi 
for the next 40 years (Póvoa 1993, Póvoa et al. 2001).
DDT spraying was also officially undertaken 
throughout the Amazon in 1960 (Hochman 2008). Dur-
ing the 1960s, malaria cases were confined to the Am-
azon. Remaining transmission was attributed to (i) the 
dispersed Amazon population hindering control, (ii) 
housing that lacked or only had partial walls, which fa-
cilitated vector contact and hindered DDT spraying and 
(iii) CQ resistant P. falciparum (Barata 1995).
Different Amazon habitats had different malaria pro-
files. The rubber plantations had low population density 
and mobility. DDT application and bed nets were benefi-
cial and reduced transmission. In the pastures, there was 
also low incidence due to low worker density and little 
An. darlingi habitat. Construction camps were generally 
free of malaria due to vector control, early diagnosis and 
treatment. “Closed” prospectors were free of malaria be-
cause their working environment was unfavourable to 
transmission, but opencast prospectors actually created 
ideal vector habitat and thus worked in high malaria in-
cidence areas. Furthermore, they worked in few clothes 
during peak vector activity periods and there were many 
asymptomatic carriers. The leading edge of Amazon 
colonisation was also a high-risk zone due to the pres-
ence of ideal An. darlingi habitat where deforestation 
was occurring. Amerindians had more or less malaria 
incidence depending on their exposure to “the white 
man” (Marques et al. 1986, Packard 2007).
Until 1960, the USA had continued to renew the 
agreement SESP was based upon due to the Cold War. 
SESP activities shifted to highlighting the positive im-
pact of cooperation between the two nations by creating 
“human capital” for Brazil’s development plans, instead 
of just areas that produced materials Americans needed. 
SESP became the provider of public health services to 
regions Brazil wanted to economically develop, includ-
ing the São Francisco Valley and the Amazon. SESP lost 
its autonomy when it lost American funding and became 
the Public Health Special Service Foundation (FSESP) 
under the Ministry of Health (de Campos 2008).
During the 1960s, the government began to secure 
Brazil’s borders by colonisation and the construction of 
roads linking the North with other regions (Marques et 
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al. 1986, Packard 2007). Manaus and Porto Velho had 
epidemics due to the influx of immigrants from the Bra-
zilian Amazon and the creation of slums where mosqui-
toes could breed (Barata 1995). 
Brazil adopts the CEM 
In September 1965, the Brazilian government adopt-
ed a CEM model recommended by the WHO. CEM was 
financially and administratively autonomous and relied 
upon DDT spraying and antimalarial distribution where 
malaria was present. CEM eliminated malaria from the 
Northeast, the Southeast, the Central-West and the South 
(Moran 1993).
As the number of malaria tests increased to 1.7 million 
per year by 1969, the number of positive tests diminished. 
However, control efforts did not eradicate transmission 
outside of the home and P. falciparum began to show 
signs of CQ resistance. Additional factors that led to the 
failure of CEM included the absence of social and health 
infrastructure and the presence of at risk populations of 
miners, agricultural colonists and loggers that were often 
exposed to vectors (Loiola et al. 2002, Coura et al. 2006).
CEM was suspended in 1970 due to decreased cas-
es, criticism of the public health administrative model 
and concerns over DDT brought on by the book Silent 
Spring (Hochman 2008). There were only 28,557 cases 
of P. falciparum in a population of 92.3 million Brazil-
ians in 1970 (PAHO 1991, Barata 1995). Of these, 73% 
of the remaining cases occurred in the Amazon due to its 
climate and wall-less dwellings (Deane 1988). Malaria 
had been reduced to 1% of its incidence in 1950 (Stepan 
2003). There were less than 100 autochthonous malaria 
cases each year in SP (Barata 1998).
Malaria control is integrated into public health ser-
vices and malaria increases 
During the 1970s, the Superintendent of the Public 
Campaigns of Brazil (SUCAM) (which evolved from the 
National Department for Rural Endemic Diseases) inte-
grated the malaria eradication programs with other pro-
grams, including the general census in 1970, the smallpox 
eradication program in 1971, the action against menin-
gococcal meningitis and Chagas disease in 1975 and the 
campaign against leishmaniasis and leprosy notification 
in 1976 (Agudelo 1990). This integration of malaria erad-
ication with other public health programs reduced the re-
sources available for malaria control (Loiola et al. 2002).
In 1974, all Brazilian malaria regions had been 
through the attack phase and there were only 50,000 
cases (Barata 1998). Of these, 24,000 cases were regis-
tered in states of Acre (AC), Maranhão (MA), AM, PA 
and more than 12,000 occurred along the Trans-Amazo-
nian Highway and its surroundings (Gadelha 1998). By 
1976, malaria was under control in the South, Southeast, 
Northeast and part of the Central-West. Malaria was 
only prevalent in the Amazon and Northeast (Coura et 
al. 2006). Yet malaria transmission began to increase, 
including in all of the areas where malaria transmission 
had been interrupted, due to more Brazilians moving 
to the Amazon for colonisation and the construction of 
hydroelectric projects and roads (Marques et al. 1986, 
Barata 1998). DDT resistance was reported by 1975 in 
Brazil and Colombia (Agudelo 1990).
In southern PR, autochthonous cases were reported 
in outbreaks that occurred in 1976 (150 cases), 1977 (296 
cases) and 1978 (413 cases), predominantly on the coast. 
Malaria also occurred to the Northeast, just north of 
Guaira, among the islands of the Paraná River and in the 
municipality of Querência do Norte. There were fewer 
cases in 1979 (Bértoli & Moitinho 2001).
The impact of migration and colonisation on malaria 
incidence 
Prior to the 1970s, there had been little Brazilian 
Amazon deforestation (Moran 1993). As late as 1975, 
only 0.6% of the Amazon had been cleared (3,000,0000 
ha). The rate of Amazon deforestation increased be-
tween 1975-1987 (with 8,000,000 ha cleared in just that 
year) (Moran 1993).
Fig. 2: this figure represents the same data as Fig. 1, with the same 
disclaimers. However, the two earlier estimates have been removed.
Fig. 1: annual estimated malaria cases in total and by species, when 
available. Estimate quality likely varies based on multiple unmeasured 
factors. Numbers reported for 1991-1994, 1996-1999 and 2009-2011 
were based on visual estimates from line and bar graphs and are report-
ed for qualitative analysis. The two early data points may be suspect 
(Coura et al. 2006, PAHO 1991, 1996, 2010, SIVEP-Malaria 2014).
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During the 1970s, the National Institute for Colo-
nisation and Agrarian Reform convinced Brazilians to 
move from the South and Southeast to Amazon Region. 
There were two colonisation programs: the Organised 
Settlement Programs, which focused on skilled farmers, 
and the Integrated Colonisation Projects (PIC), which 
focused on the landless poor (Silva-Nunes et al. 2006). 
Roads were constructed in the Amazon and the develop-
ment of small and medium-sized farms was encouraged 
continuing into the 1980s. There was an immense mi-
gration of Brazilians from the Northeast, Central-West 
and South into the Amazon, including RO, that were un-
aware of how to protect against malaria and immunolog-
ically naïve (Loiola et al. 2002).
In RO, there were 116,000 inhabitants and the annual 
parasitological index (API) was 50/1,000 in 1970 (Salce-
do et al. 2000). The Brazilian government began a devel-
opment plan that encouraged southerners to create farms 
in RO by giving them cleared land. As the land became 
exhausted, settlers shifted to cattle ranching or sold their 
land (Takken et al. 2005). Over the decade, 277,000 im-
migrants arrived (Camargo et al. 1999). By 1980, there 
were 492,810 inhabitants in RO and 96% of malaria cases 
occurred in the Amazon Region (Deane 1988, Lourenço-
de-Oliveira et al. 1989). The city of Ariquemes was the 
centre of Rondonian deforestation (Takken et al. 2005).
Previously, Brazilians had moved from the North/
Northeast to the South, but between 1970-1980 move-
ment reversed (Gadelha 1998). In total, one million Bra-
zilians moved into the Amazon, with the majority going 
to RO and other gold mining areas (Takken et al. 2005, 
Packard 2007). The construction of roads, hydroelectric 
plants, mines and livestock and agricultural projects led 
to increased malaria transmission. Malaria cases in-
creased from 52,469 in 1970 to 169,871 in 1980 (Marques 
et al. 1986, Barata 1995). In 1980, 97.5% of malaria was 
still confined to the Amazon Basin [34.8% occurred in 
RO, 22.4% in PA, 11.3% in MA, 9% in MT and 8% in 
the state of Roraima (RR)] (Barata 1995). Outside of the 
Amazon Basin, most cases occurred in the state of Goiás 
(GO), followed by PR, SP and the state of Mato Grosso 
do Sul (MS) (Barata 1995).
Unfortunately, malaria carriers spread throughout 
Brazil in a dizzyingly array of directions in the 1980s. 
Cases came from the Amazon states and constantly pre-
sented the risk of the reintroduction of autochthonous 
malaria (Barata 1995). AC had many imported cases 
arriving from RO, with a few coming from AM. AM 
received cases from gold miners arriving from RO and 
RR. AM miners also spread malaria to Itaituba, PA 
(Gadelha 1998). Other miners entered PA from north-
ern MT, particularly from the mines around Peixoto de 
Azevedo River. MA received numerous cases from PA 
and MT. Cases from RO spread to MT as well. GO re-
ceived cases from PA, MT and MA. RR received cases 
from multiple Amazon Basin states including RO, AM 
and MA (Gadelha 1998).
During the 1980s, the majority of malaria cases 
occurred in Amazon municipalities with mining and 
agricultural projects (Barata 1995). Important vectors 
included An. darlingi and Anopheles albitarsis (Póvoa 
1993). The National Institute of Colonisation projects 
called for deforestation of three or four acres in the first 
year followed by a controlled burn and then planting rice, 
corn and beans. Colonists lived in temporary camps in 
plastic tents or palm huts near the water, which favoured 
malaria transmission. At the Machadinho Project, 90% 
of colonists had malaria at least once after their arrival 
and the index of infection among An. darlingi was 5.2%. 
At many mines, malaria was resistant to control due to 
makeshift housing and the constant movement of min-
ers (Barata 1995). Hundreds of thousands of gold min-
ers entered and exited the interior and thereby spread 
malaria throughout Brazil (Marques et al. 1986). There 
were multiple migratory channels in Brazil including: 
southern PA and northern MT to MA, northern MT to 
SP, PR, GO and MS and RO to SP, PA, AC and AM 
(Barata 1995). The largest migration was into RO from 
everywhere, but the North, followed by northeasterners 
moving into PA. Most settled along the Trans-Amazoni-
an Highway or at mining locations (Marques 1987).
SUCAM focuses on Amazonian malaria control 
SUCAM focused its attention on the Amazon during 
the 1980s, particularly in areas with hydroelectric, mining 
and subsistence farming projects. It applied DDT indoors, 
eliminated mosquito breeding grounds and supplied anti-
malarial drugs, as well as technical supervision. It aban-
doned CEM in favour of nuanced local projects with ep-
idemiological stratification and “microzoning” (Barata 
1995). It divided the Amazon Region into priority areas 
I and II based on risk factors that could impact epidemi-
ology (Coura et al. 2006, Atanaka-Santos et al. 2007). 
Priority I regions had “frank” transmission and were ex-
amined by SUCAM district boards for case classification 
and provenance identification. Priority II regions had low 
intensity, stable transmission and cases were to be inves-
tigated for identification and classification of local trans-
mission when possible (Marques et al. 1986). The new 
approach was first used in PA and RO (Loiola et al. 2002).
New techniques were used, including outdoor ul-
tra-low-volume nebulisation, mass treatment, impreg-
nated curtains and new insecticides. In other areas, 
including colonisation areas in RO, control efforts re-
mained unchanged despite their failure (Barata 1995). 
Traditional control methods were ineffective in states 
like RO, in communities along the Amazon River. In 
such communities, screening homes was ineffective be-
cause walls were porous and allowed air flow, sylvatic 
vectors were behaviourally resistant to DDT domicile 
spraying and inhabitants would have to stay under bed 
nets between 05:00 pm-06:00 am. This left patient care 
as the only viable control method, which might prove in-
effective due to asymptomatic cases (Alves et al. 2005).
Malaria cases increase in the Amazon Region 
From 1980-1985, malaria cases increased 2.4 times 
(Barata 1995). In AC, there were 5,000 participants in the 
settlement program in 1981 and 33,600 by 1985, while 
the population of RO went from 570,000-1,040,000. PA’s 
mining areas doubled in population, due to the influx of 
immigrants from the state of Piauí (PI), MA, GO and CE 
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(Marques 1987). In 1983, 98% of malaria cases in SP were 
introduced and cases occurred in farm workers, miners and 
truck drivers (Barata 1998). By 1984, 92% of the 205,000 
cases of malaria were reported among the 12 million peo-
ple living in the northern and western Amazon and the re-
mainder were exported from these regions (PAHO 1984). 
New foci of infection were found in PI, CE, BA, MG, MS 
and RJ (Packard 2007). In 1985, 86.4% of Brazilian ma-
laria cases were in PA and RO and restricted to mining, 
riverine and settlement areas (Oliveira Filho 1992).
In 1986, 99% of malaria cases occurred in the Ama-
zon (Deane 1988). Autochthonous cases predominated in 
the Amazon states, with movement between them lead-
ing to imported cases as well. RO, RR and AP had the 
highest autochthony indexes and were also the least influ-
enced by neighbouring states. Many of the cases reported 
in AC came from RO and the border with Bolivia. In AM, 
most cases from Manaus and the middle of the state were 
imported, but autochthonous cases predominated else-
where. In Belém it appeared that the neighbouring AP 
and MA contributed cases. In GO, most cases came from 
the municipalities of PA and MT. Cases in MT were gen-
erally autochthonous though some cases came from RO 
(Marques et al. 1986). Malaria cases began to increase in 
the southern state of PR (Bértoli & Moitinho 2001).
In the Northeast, Southeast, South and a portion of 
the Central-West, most cases were introduced from the 
Amazon. The one exception was BA, where autochtho-
nous cases and introduced malaria (mostly from RO) 
were present. While there were autochthonous cases in 
the northeastern states of PI and CE, returning migra-
tory workers also introduced malaria. In the Southeast, 
there were few autochthonous cases with the majority 
imported from RO and secondarily PA. In the South, cas-
es were almost all imported, particularly from MT and 
RO. Autochthonous cases were registered in two munic-
ipalities along the SC coast and in western PR on some 
Paraná River islands. In general, malaria outbreaks did 
not occur in locations with major infrastructure or where 
migrants were under the direct control of big business or 
the government (Marques et al. 1986).
During a few months in 1986, the government mobi-
lised human and financial resources to rapidly reduce the 
morbidity and mortality associated with malaria in MT, 
PA and RO in “Operation Impact.” At the time, these 
states contained 80% of Brazil’s malaria. Approximately 
2,000 staff were transferred to cover these regions. Me-
floquine treatment of P. falciparum was introduced to 
treat resistant P. falciparum cases, but CQ, primaquine 
and sulphadoxine pyrimethamine were also used. Oper-
ation Impact’s outcome did not justify the high resource 
cost, nor the indiscriminate use of mefloquine in hyper-
endemic areas (Loiola et al. 2002). Malaria cases went 
from 52,469 cases in 1970 to 559,535 in 1988 (Brazilian 
Ministry of Health, unpublished observations).
By 1988, Amazon deforestation had declined be-
cause of a recession and hyperinflation (Moran 1993). 
During the 1940s, An. darlingi had made up 26% of the 
anopheline species composition, but it was 77.7% in the 
1980s and greater than 90% in the 1990s. An. darlingi 
behaviour seems to have become less endophilic as well 
(Gil et al. 2003).
The government responds with the Amazon Basin 
Malaria Control Project (PCMAM) 
In 1989, the Brazilian government asked the World 
Bank to fund the PCMAM due to the increasing problem 
of malaria and regional political pressure. The World Bank 
provided Brazil with $99 million dollars and the govern-
ment provided another $99 million. The funds were to be 
used over the next five years. The goals of PCMAM were 
(i) to reduce malaria’s occurrence, (ii) to develop SUCAM 
and the state secretariats of health and (iii) to focus atten-
tion on the health of indigenous communities. PCMAM 
also developed local public health services with regards to 
diagnostics and treatment (Loiola et al. 2002).
In 1980, all homes in malaria-affected areas were 
sprayed with residual insecticide, but PCMAM shifted 
to limited insecticide application to the minimal number 
of houses required. PCMAM focused on applying in-
secticides through outdoor ultra-low volume application 
and thermonebulisation, particularly in AM. While se-
lective vector control was an important policy advance-
ment, in practical terms there was not enough staff for 
implementation (Loiola et al. 2002).
In 1990, Amazon had 99% of Brazil’s malaria cases, 
85% of which occurred in just 79 Amazon municipalities 
(PAHO 1991, Barata 1998). Disease spillover from the 
Amazon most affected SP and PR because of most indi-
viduals leaving the Amazon were diagnosed and treated 
in those states. In SP, 15 municipalities had transmission, 
while 224 had imported cases (Barata 1998). Agricultur-
al practices in AC and RO also encouraged malaria cases 
(PAHO 1991). Malaria was most prevalent in RO (33.4% 
of all cases among 1,130,000 inhabitants and an API 
of 216.7/1,000), PA (20.1%) and MT (25%), where min-
ers were active (PAHO 1991, Salcedo et al. 2000). The 
principle Amazonian vector was An. darlingi, but on the 
coast it was Anopheles aquasalis (PAHO 1991, Dourado 
1992). The government did not provide RR with public 
health care until 1991 (Chaves & Rodrigues 2000).
Mining and public works continued to encourage 
malaria as exemplified by Peixoto de Azevedo, MT, 
and the Itaipu reservoir, in PR. Peixoto de Azevedo was 
founded in May 1986 after the discovery of gold and 
became home to ~30,000 miners. As the price of gold 
dropped and it became more difficult to mine, the min-
ers relocated, with some moving to Leonislândia to start 
small farms in 1993. In 1996, Leonislândia had 4,000 
inhabitants, with homes built close to the forest and near 
streams. These conditions led to the quick establishment 
of malaria and An. darlingi (Duarte et al. 2004).
The Itaipu reservoir led to malaria cases between 
1994-1999. Cases were attributed to movement of hosts 
between the Brazilian Amazon and Paraguay and new 
mosquito breeding grounds at the Itaipu Lake. The Na-
tional Health Foundation (FUNASA) had undertaken 
household spraying and reduced cases starting in 1990, 
but the reservoir created a new epidemic in 1995. Other 
issues that contributed to the increase in malaria cases 
included the proximity of towns to other reservoirs that 
could support An. darlingi, the development of profes-
sional fishing and leisure activities around the reservoirs 
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and homes that were typically wooden huts that allowed 
vectors inside and made insecticide spraying difficult 
(Bértoli & Moitinho 2001).
PCMAM paralysed 
In 1991, the Ministry of Health combined SUCAM 
with FSESP, the National Secretariat of Special Health 
Programs and National Secretariat of Basic Health Ac-
tions into the FUNASA. As a result, PCMAM was “prac-
tically paralysed” between 1991-1993. During this time, 
private control efforts were also conducted. In the munic-
ipality of Calçoene, AP, a mining company started ma-
laria control efforts in 1991 with help from the Evandro 
Chagas Institute and FUNASA. At the beginning of the 
1980s, Lourenço, the district where Calçoene was locat-
ed, had greater than 50% of the malaria found in AP. The 
mining company’s program involved improving the qual-
ity of hospital facilities, laboratories, vector vigilance 
and control and training of personal (Couto et al. 2001).
Given the difficulties implementing PCMAM, it was 
extended for another three years, though the funding for 
the program was reduced. The Integrated Malaria Control 
Program was created, which was effectively PCMAM ad-
justed to account for recent WHO strategies, particularly 
early patient diagnosis and timely and appropriate treat-
ment (Coura et al. 2006). With PCMAM back on track, 
the Brazilians increased the diagnostic laboratory and 
treatment network and the number of doctors and support 
staff (Loiola et al. 2002). They also made malaria treat-
ment widely available through mining area shops and all 
fevers were presumptively treated. CQ was the first line 
treatment and mefloquine was the second (Barat 2006). 
From 1989-1996, 81% of malaria cases were P. vivax and 
17.1% were P. falciparum (Salcedo et al. 2000, Martínez-
Espinosa et al. 2004). The incidence of malaria began to 
diminish in 1989 due to control strategy changes and a 
shift in colonisation zones to occupation rather than de-
forestation (Barata 1995). PCMAM reduced malaria from 
577,787 cases in 1989 to 221,600 cases in 1996 and the 
mortality rate went from 7/1,000 in 1988 to 1.8/1,000 in 
1995 (Loiola et al. 2002, Packard 2007).
PCMAM falters 
Unfortunately, as PCMAM funding depleted, malar-
ia resurged. FUNASA created a new plan to intensify 
malaria control at the end of 1996, which focused on 100 
municipalities with APIs of greater than 50/1,000 and 
in some municipalities and state capitals where malaria 
was a serious problem despite lower APIs. Decentrali-
sation of the public health response was also attempted 
with mixed results; while municipalities were involved 
in the process, the role of state government was not ade-
quately valued and therefore there was no local funding 
when federal money ran out (Barat 2006).
Between 1998-1999 there was a 26% or 34% increase 
in malaria cases, which demonstrated the instability and 
fragility of the surveillance system (Barata 1995, Loiola 
et al. 2002). In 1999, there were 631,000 malaria cases, of 
which 99.7% occurred in the Brazilian Amazon (Duarte 
et al. 2004, Packard 2007). During the 1990s, malaria was 
in all the Amazon states. In AM, the highest API occurred 
around Manaus among migrants in poor sanitation are-
as where vectors could breed. There were 21,234 malaria 
cases in Manaus in 1997 and 83% were P. vivax (Mar-
tínez-Espinosa et al. 2004). In PA, the highest APIs were 
associated with mining and colonisation projects (Póvoa 
et al. 2001). In AP, cases occurred in important mining 
areas and Anopheles marajoara was reported as a new 
emerging vector (Barata 1995, Póvoa et al. 2001). In RR, 
the high APIs occurred where mining was taking place 
(Barata 1995). In western MT, malaria was hypoendemic, 
as in most of the Brazilian Amazon and the highest num-
ber of cases occurred in areas with mining areas (Barata 
1995, Duarte et al. 2004). In AC, cases were localised near 
agricultural and rubber plantations around Abunã River 
(Barata 1995). In RO, the high APIs occurred where min-
ing and colonisation projects were taking place. By 2000, 
deforestation had reached Porto Velho. Cattle replaced 
farm crops. These factors encouraged An. darlingi popu-
lation increases (Takken et al. 2005).
The government introduces the Program for the In-
tensification of Malaria Control (PIACM) 
The Brazilian Government announced in October 
1999 that they would reduce malaria cases by 2001 to 
half the number seen in 1999 and half the mortality by 
2002 at the first international meeting of the Roll Back 
Malaria program of the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO) in Peru. They would do this through the 
PIACM in the nine-state legal Amazon. PIACM started 
in 2000 and cost $50.2 million (Loiola et al. 2002, Tak-
ken et al. 2005, Silva-Nunes et al. 2006).
PIACM had new elements: (i) political involvement at 
all levels of government, (ii) regional development, (iii) 
an assessment of the social development cost of malar-
ia, (iv) integration of related government offices includ-
ing the Ministries of Health and Agrarian Reform, (v) 
a structured service strategy, (vi) periodic assessments 
of progress and (vii) a guarantee of consistent funding 
from all levels of government (Loiola et al. 2002). Vector 
control was expanded with more equipment, vehicles and 
personnel. This allowed for increased indoor insecticide 
spraying and the spatial treatment of outbreaks. Drain-
age projects in urban centres including Manaus and Porto 
Velho were also undertaken. In addition, it was decid-
ed that all new settlements would have to be extensively 
evaluated for malaria prevention (Takken et al. 2005).
In 1999 there were 630,985 malaria cases, but by 
2001 there had been a drastic reduction to 383,654 cases. 
P. falciparum cases were reduced by 35% and P. vivax 
cases by 41%. Such a reduction had not occurred in the 
last 41 years and was attributed to the implementation 
of PIACM in 2000 in most states, its implementation in 
2001 in AP and a similar AM plan that had been imple-
mented in 1999 (Loiola et al. 2002). Success varied by 
state. AM and AC had more than a 60% reduction, while 
AP reduced cases by 15% and RO, 9% (Massarani 2001).
FUNASA expanded the network of surveillance, 
diagnosis and treatment at the local level and therefore 
malaria cases were detected faster, leading to a more 
rapid break in the chain of transmission. The budget for 
disease control in the Amazon tripled to $54 million in 
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2001 leading Carlos Catão Prates Loiola to say: “we are 
seeing…an increase in the mobilisation and competence 
of state and local staff. But…the extra health ministry 
funding was critical.” (Massarani 2001). By 2002, diag-
nosis and accurate treatment had improved and it was 
possible to be properly diagnosed within 24 h in most of 
the affected areas. However, it was also argued that vec-
tor control was 20% of what it should have been (Loiola 
et al. 2002). In 2002 and 2003 there was another increase 
in malaria transmission (Marcano et al. 2004). In 2004, 
there were 350,000 cases of malaria in Brazil [455,448 
cases (Brazilian Ministry of Health, unpublished obser-
vations)] (Silva-Nunes et al. 2006).
Malaria control passes to the National Program for 
Malaria Prevention and Control (PNCM) 
By 2005, malaria control had passed to the PNCM. 
Its objectives were to reduce mortality, severe malar-
ia and overall malaria incidence (Coura et al. 2006). 
PNCM also encompassed a malaria information system 
(Malaria Epidemiological Surveillance Information Sys-
tem) for managing epidemiological data and consolida-
tion of routine tasks like forwarding compiled results 
to regional offices and their headquarters. Monitored 
variables include city-level transmission estimates, drug 
dispensation and treatment failure. In 2007, 47 Amazo-
nian municipalities accounted for 70% of malaria cases. 
By 2008, malaria had returned to numbers close to those 
seen in 1983 (314,420 cases) and the Amazonian API 
had dropped to 12.8. PNCM thought that their efforts 
to strengthen local capacity, diagnosis and treatment ac-
counted for the reduction starting in 2006. In 2010, the 
Global Fund agreed to fund a Ministry of Health project 
aimed at strengthening local public health capacity in the 
Amazon by ensuring early diagnosis, timely treatment 
and extending bed net coverage, as well as municipal 
and state-level management. The artesunate mefloquine 
combination drug used in AC was being produced local-
ly in adult and child doses, but in other Amazon states 
arthemeter plus lumefantrine was the drug of choice for 
P. falciparum cases. Due to the concentration of malar-
ia cases in the Amazon, physicians outside of that area 
were less likely to consider diagnosing malaria when 
febrile patients presented (Oliveira-Ferreira et al. 2010).
Between 2010-2013, there has been a decline in 
malaria cases in Amazonian states of Brazil. Between 
2012-2013, AM (-8%), MA (-12%), PA (-69%) and RO 
(-38%) all showed a decrease in malaria cases. AP (+1%), 
MT (-1%) and RR (0%) showed little to no change in 
the number of cases, while the number of cases in AC 
increased (28%). Among these states, reported malaria 
cases went from 246,608 in 2011 (unpublished govern-
mental data reports 266,975 cases), to 227,379 in 2012 
(unpublished governmental data report 243,752 cases), to 
166,689 in 2013 (unpublished governmental data report 
78,490 cases) (SIVEP-Malária 2014). The few cases that 
occurred outside of the Amazon Region were generally 
introduced to regions which were previously malaria en-
demic. However, a very few cases (0.05%) were due to 
autochthonous malaria along the southeastern Atlantic 
coastal forest (de Pina-Costa et al. 2014).
History of drug use and first reports of resistance 
P. falciparum’s resistance to quinine and CQ developed 
quickly in Brazil. Quinine was already the antimalarial of 
choice in Brazil at the beginning of the XX century. How-
ever, quinine resistance was first noted in 1907 in RJ and 
then again in 1910 after it was distributed as a prophylactic 
to railway workers in RO (Neiva 1910, da Silva & Benchi-
mol 2014). CQ was first used from 1946-1947 in Belém 
and Santarém hospitals at a dosage of 1,500 mg. P. fal-
ciparum recrudescence was reported, leading one author 
to suggest that there were already CQ resistant parasites 
circulating prior to CQ’s introduction (Reyes 1981). It was 
distributed as chloroquinised salt in PA from 1952-1953, 
PR from 1952-1954, MA from 1953-1954, state of Minais 
Gerais starting in 1956, SC state starting in 1956, AP state 
starting in 1957 and along the Amazon River starting in 
1959 (Payne 1988). This likely led to its use at less than 
adequate dosages by the general population and facilitated 
the development of resistance (de Souza 1992).
It has generally been established that South Ameri-
can CQ resistance began on the border of Colombia and 
Venezuela and then spread throughout the continent. 
This may be incorrect or only partially true. After CQ 
resistance was reported in Colombia in 1961 in an inter-
national journal, CQ resistance was suddenly reported 
in Porto Velho, Belém and along the 300 km Belém-
Brasília Road. Malaria recrudescence after CQ treat-
ment was reported in AP, AM and RR in the same year 
(Box et al. 1963, Reyes 1981, de Souza 1992). This falls 
into a simple narrative described above.
However, Dr R Brito and A Pinheiro reported that 
there was CQ resistance in RO in 1954 to Heath Sec-
retary of the Federal Territory of Guaporé and later at 
a National Health meeting (de Souza 1992). Based on 
this information, resistance could have spread from the 
western Brazilian Amazon to the rest of the Brazilian 
Amazon and the border of Colombia and Venezuela. If 
this were the case, the prevailing understanding of how 
CQ resistance spread in South America might be misin-
formed due to underreporting.
Regardless, in response to CQ resistance, an investi-
gative centre was created by PAHO/WHO at the Santa 
Teresa Psychiatric Hospital in Ribeirão Preto, SP. By 
1965 CQ resistance was again reported in Belém, as 
well as Manaus. Over the next two years it was again 
reported in PA and RR, as well as in the state of Espírito 
Santo and MG. Overall, drug susceptibility studies sug-
gested that 56% of cases were CQ resistant during the 
1960s (PAHO 1984). CQ resistance was reported in MT 
by 1969, but CQ resistance was first reported in AC in 
1980 (Reyes 1981). In 1981, 25% of parasites in MA were 
resistant to CQ (Silva et al. 1984).
By the end of the 1970s, CQ resistance had increased 
substantially (PAHO 1984). By the 1980s, CQ resistance 
was reported throughout Brazil (Reyes 1981). In Belém, 
patients treated with CQ, amodiaquine and sulphadoxine 
pyrimethamine had a cure rate of 10% and less than 20% 
in Goiânia, GO in 1987 (P. falciparum resistance to amo-
diaquine was also reported in the 1960s) (de Souza 1992). 
In AC, 73% of samples were resistant to amodiaquine and 
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84% were resistance to CQ in the same year (Kremsner et 
al. 1989). Another study conducted in 1997 with 10 patients 
showed that 100% of the samples were RI or RII resistant 
to CQ and amodiaquine, while one was RIII resistant to 
quinine (4 from RO, 4 from MT and 2 from PA) (Segu-
rado et al. 1997). In 1998 in PA, only 4% of parasites were 
CQ sensitive in Macapá and Serra do Navio, where miners 
around the Serra do Navio had been using chloroquinised 
salt for prophylaxis. However, they were all susceptible to 
mefloquine, amodiaquine and quinine (Póvoa et al. 1998). 
According to molecular studies, CQ resistance was prev-
alent by the early 1980s and did not disappear over time 
(Vieira et al. 2001, 2004, Cortese et al. 2002, Ferreira et al. 
2008, Mehlotra et al. 2008, Gama et al. 2009).
Like quinine and CQ, pyrimethamine resistance 
appeared soon after its initial use. Pyrimethamine was 
used in neighbouring Venezuela in 1956 with early re-
ports of drug resistance by 1959 (Gabaldón et al. 1959, 
Maberti 1960). Sulphadoxine pyrimethamine was first 
used in trials at the beginning of the 1960s in response 
to reports of CQ resistance and then applied in public 
health interventions in the 1970s (Walker & Lopez-
Antunano 1968). Between 1965-1967, a study conducted 
in four Brazilian localities showed that 102 out of 104 
infections were cured when treated with sulfadoxine-py-
rimethamine (PAHO 1984). In 1968, 18 strains collected 
from Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela were used to in-
oculate patients in SP. Some strains were shown to be 
mildly resistant to pyrimethamine (collected in Belém 
and Boa Vista, RR) or moderately resistant (Machado 
River, R, El Pescado, Colombia, Igarapé Mirim, PA, 
Barcarena, PA, Puerto Ayacucho, Venezuela, and Cri-
pori River, close to PA), with one strain reported to have 
RII resistance (collected in Goiânia). However, all were 
sensitive to pyrimethamine when used in combination 
with various sulphonamides. In the same study, three 
of fifteen “attacks” treated with quinine were not cured 
(Walker & Lopez-Antunano 1968).
Resistance to sulfadoxine in Brazil appears to have 
taken longer to develop than other drugs. Sulfadoxine-py-
rimethamine resistance was first reported in 1972 in Bra-
zil (de Souza 1992). A retrospective study of treatment 
between 1974 -1979 showed that in GO, five patients did 
not clear parasites from their blood with the application of 
sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine and another showed that 164 
patients showed RII level resistance to sulfadoxine-py-
rimethamine in Amazon. Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine 
resistance was also reported in MA in 1978 (Alecrim 
et al. 1982, Alecrim 1986, de Souza 1992). In the early 
1980s, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine treatment failed 16-
63% of the time in Brazil (Peterson et al. 1991). In the 
western Amazon, only 30% of cases treated with sulfa-
doxine-pyrimethamine were cured, though the cure rate 
was 75% in the eastern Amazon (de Souza 1992). During 
1980 and 1981, RI sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine resist-
ance was seen 25% of parasites in Paragominas, Brazil 
(WHO 1985). In 1981, 16% of parasites were resistant to 
sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine in MA (Silva et al. 1984). By 
1982, RI resistance to sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine was 
reported in patients from the Tapajós River, PA, Maués, 
AM, Ariquemes, RO, and MT. RII resistance was report-
ed in Maués and Humaita. Perhaps more troubling, RIII 
resistance was reported along BR-319, a road that con-
nects Manaus to Porto Velho (Alecrim et al. 1982). By 
1984, 30-50% of infections were no longer cured by sul-
fadoxine-pyrimethamine in Brazil (PAHO 1984), though 
it was as high as 60% in the eastern Amazon (de Souza 
1992). In 1985, 52 patients infected with Amazon strains 
and treated with sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine showed RI 
in 32.7%, RII in 42.3% RII and RIII in 7.7% of cases 
(Alecrim 1986). In 1987, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine re-
sistance in eastern Amazon was 90% and 92% in western 
AC (Kremsner et al. 1989, de Souza 1992) 
By the end of the 1980s, 90% of parasites were sul-
fadoxine-pyrimethamine resistant. Brazil shifted to 
quinine-tetracycline as the standard treatment for un-
complicated P. falciparum, followed by quinine and 
doxycycline and mefloquine plus primaquine as a sec-
ondary-line drug (Duarte et al. 1996, Gama et al. 2009). 
While there was an illegal market for mefloquine among 
miners, there was no reported resistance except for a few 
case that might have been due to patient malabsorption 
(Póvoa 1993). A report from 2001 showed that 23.8% 
of uncomplicated malaria cases in AC were resistant to 
quinine plus doxycycline (Leal et al. 2003). Parasites 
collected from MT showed reduced quinine sensitivity, 
though only a few showed high quinine resistance in the 
late 1990s. Parasites were also susceptible to mefloquine 
and halofantrine (Zalis et al. 1998). According to molec-
ular studies, low-level sulphadoxine pyrimethamine re-
sistance was widespread in 1987 and higher levels prev-
alent by the late 1990s (Peterson et al. 1991, Vasconcelos 
et al. 2000, Cortese et al. 2002, Gama et al. 2009).
More recently, new combination therapies have been 
used in Brazil. From 2006-2008, a pilot study of fixed-
dose artesunate plus mefloquine (ASMQ) for the treat-
ment of P. falciparum was applied at three sites in AC to 
good effect (Santelli et al. 2012). This result spurred the 
Ministry of Health to implement ASMQ nationally during 
2007-2008, along with arthemeter plus lumefantrine. In 
rural locations in the Amazon, quinine plus antibiotics was 
still wildly used to treat P. falciparum. However, large hos-
pitals in the Amazon used artemisinin plus lumefantrine 
(Camargo et al. 2009). Mefloquine was not recommended 
for use in endemic areas as it has a very long half-life and 
can generate P. falciparum resistant strains.
Unlike P. falciparum, P. vivax only recently showed 
signs of CQ resistance. Reports from 2000 and 2007 
suggest that P. vivax is becoming resistant to CQ in 
Manaus. In a study of 109 volunteers with uncomplicat-
ed infection that completed the in vivo test in 2004-2005, 
11 showed clinical failure when treated with 150 mg CQ 
tablets every 24 h for 27 days (Barbosa et al. 2007).
Concluding remarks
The incidence and distribution of malaria across Bra-
zil have varied over modern history. Despite this, once it 
reached the Amazon interior, it bloomed. Even now the 
Amazon Basin accounts for 99% of Brazil’s reported cases 
with regional increases in incidence often associated with 
large scale public works or economic shifts. Furthermore, 
as sporadic outbreaks and autochthones zones outside the 
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Amazon attest, malaria can easily regain the ground it 
loses due to flagging surveillance and control. Man-made 
environmental changes like those inadvertently caused by 
dams, open pit mining or deforestation of the Amazon Ba-
sin are obvious self-inflicted wounds to successful malaria 
control. On the other hand, it appears that deforestation 
outside the Amazon Basin along the coastline in AP and 
in northern SP reduced the incidence of malaria by reduc-
ing the number of bromeliads and thus the number of An. 
(Kerteszia) cruzi (Gadelha 1994, Tauil 2011).
The question of how to control or even eliminate 
malaria from the Brazilian Amazon has vexed regional 
experts for as long as Brazil has existed. The XX cen-
tury showed that efficient antimalarials and insecticides 
are effective control methods, if they don’t fail. Unfortu-
nately, they all seem to eventually fail, albeit hopefully 
at a much slower rate in the future due to the lessons 
learned during CEM.
During the rise of these chemicals to ascendency, 
there was an alternate school of thought which suggest-
ed that a more holistic approach to public health would 
engender the same benefits. As our review notes, the liv-
ing conditions of poor Brazilians in rural locations have 
supported endemic malaria. However, improvements to 
domiciles and work environments are inherently more 
difficult than distributing antimalarials and applying in-
secticides when the communities most impacted are ad 
hoc collections of agriculturalists or miners where ma-
laria is constantly reintroduced.
Yet Brazil’s past successes with such holistic meth-
ods suggest that they can reduce the incidence of malaria 
when consistently applied. The successful provision and 
use of bed nets is a simple way to improve the quality 
of housing when public health officials cannot patch the 
open air of an Amazonian home. More difficult than the 
distribution of bed nets is to confront and fill the ditches 
and other water collections near communities that may 
move with the next economic boom. Aside from public 
health efforts, increases in per capita income over the 
long term may indirectly reduce the incidence of malaria 
in the Amazon Basin through the improvement of basic 
living conditions by citizens themselves.
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from Brazil’s his-
tory is that malaria control needs to be placed on per-
manent and well-funded ground (da Silva & de Oliveira 
2002). Another obvious lesson is that public works pro-
grams and efforts to settle the Amazon require careful 
public health surveillance and sanitary engineering prior 
to shifts in human populations. A more ambiguous les-
son is that combining malaria control with other public 
health service may be ill-advised, based on past experi-
ences in Brazil and Venezuela (Griffing et al. 2014).
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